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In a dramatic attempt to shift to a market economy, Poland has
taken steps to try to insure that it can compete in the world market
of the twenty-first century. By enacting legislation such as the Privatization Law of 1990 and the Foreign Investment Law of 1991, Poland
has provided foreign investors with incentives necessary to facilitate
the investment process. Despite these incentives, however, many legal
issues await every prospective investor involved in the privatization
process, such as:
- What are the potential benefits and/or drawbacks posed
by the new legislation?
- How have specific corporate entities adapted to the
privatization process in its entirety?
- How feasible is it that the current privatization strategy
will achieve its goals?
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INTRODUCTION

The face of Central and Eastern Europe has undergone some historic changes both politically and economically in recent years. More
market-oriented systems typical of the West have replaced centrally
planned economies.' Leading the way into the new era of capitalism
is Poland, which started this movement approximately twelve years
ago.
In 1980, the trade union Solidarity forced the Communist leadership
of Poland to recognize it as a legal entity. 2 This first step of recognition
resulted in free elections and, later, new leadership. The Lech Walesaled government has implemented new programs to help Poland shift
control of the economy from the government to the public. The thrust
of this process will be accomplished largely through the "privatization"
of state-owned enterprises. As many Polish citizens lack the means
necessary to successfully privatize state-owned enterprises, the Polish
government has welcomed the opportunity to capitalize on foreign
investment.
This article will focus on the path that Poland has chosen to facilitate foreign investment, as well as analyze specific legislation enacted
to govern the process. Legal obstacles and benefits are examined, as
is the application of the legislation to specific foreign investment procedures. The conclusion of the article will discuss the probability of
Poland's success or failure based upon the current course of the privatization process.
To better understand the foundation of privatization and its chances
for success, the general framework of Poland and its economic make-up
must be understood. Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, Poland
was the second largest country and the second largest economy in
Central and Eastern Europe. 3 Approximately half of Poland's gross
national product is contributed by heavy industry, with the agricultural
and service sectors contributing the remainder.4 An important factor
guiding Poland's future is its strategic placement in Central Europe;
"[t]he country's geographic location between Germany and Russia,

1. A centrally planned economy is based upon a non-competitive market structure. It is
typified by overproduction and an excessive workforce maintained to drive down unemployment
rates; inefficient compared to market oriented systems.
2. The trade unions forced legal recognition through a continuous lack of production in the
work place.
3.

Kaszubski, Overview of the Law Governing Foreign Investment in Poland, 549 PL/

COMM 323 (July 16-17, 1990).
4.

Id.
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albeit her greatest misfortune, may turn out to be her biggest asset
in a new Europe." 5 Poland is located on the Baltic Sea, directly in the
center of the continent, and has well-equipped port facilities. 6 The
country also has one of the best rail systems in Europe, as well as
an extensive road system. 7 Many major European airlines fly there."
Geographically, Poland lends itself to ideal investment opportunities, but the economic and human elements of the country must
be analyzed to determine the potential advantages and disadvantages
of such investment. The Polish standard of living, in many respects,
is below that of other Central and Eastern European countries like
Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czechoslovak Republics. 9 Poland has lagged behind in communications, with only 128 telephones per 1,000
persons, and in transportation with only 105 cars per 1,000 persons. 10
Poland is less urbanized than either the Czechoslovak Republics or
Bulgaria, with 61.2% of the population living in cities."' Due in part
to the lower rate of urbanization, Poland has the lowest rate of housing
construction after Romania. 2 Lastly, Polish health and environmental
regulations are not as well-developed as they are in Hungary, Bulgaria,
1
and the Czechoslovak Republics.
Despite these drawbacks, Poland containscertain positive elements
uncharacteristic of other Central and Eastern European nations.
Poland is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous.
There are no disputes over regional secession, and the only land dispute was with the Germans - now a settled issue. The skewed age
distribution14 and the cheap 5 and well-skilled labor of the population,
as well as the underdeveloped domestic market, make Poland a potentially interesting site for overseas investors. Poland should be particu-

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Jungr, Poland; First Quarter 1991, Business Int'l, Global Forecasting Service, at 9
(Mar. 28, 1991).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. There was a high rate of population growth in Poland in the 1980's. Id. at 8. The age
distribution is therefore heavily skewed, with 58% of the population in the working age group. Id.
15. Kaszubski, supra note 3. Average job pays 800,000 zlotys per month which equals 84
United States dollars per month [as of December, 1991]. Id.
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larly appealing to those investors involved in the production of generic
consumer goods. 16
It also is important to note that Poland has a competitive engineering sector, a potentially very profitable agricultural sector, and an
extremely underdeveloped consumer goods and services sector. All
these economic elements tend to interest foreign firms. 17 Poland also
has an excellent educational system. Producing more high school
graduates than its Central and Eastern European neighbors, Poland
offers investors an intelligent, literate workforce.' The latter attributes seem to be more determinative of Poland's ability to attract
foreign investment. The former attributes, however, tend to be the
result of an artificially maintained and rather inefficient economy. As
expendable income increases, they become less of a factor.
As previously noted, Poland's geography and demography offer
ideal opportunities for foreign investors, but investors need assurances
of Poland's commitment to a market-oriented economy. In this vein,
the Polish currency, the zloty, has been devalued to allow for convertibility;19 wage controls have been put in place; and foreign trade
barriers and tariffs have been, for the most part, lifted.2° As a result
of these reforms, Poland's monthly inflation rate fell from 78% in
January 1990, to 7% in February 1990.21 The zloty also became remarkably stable.2 However, the battle with inflation has slowed the economy. To combat this problem, some factories have scaled down production despite failing to satisfy demand.- The government maintains
that a positive business atmosphere has been established, and that
the present slow down is only temporary.?
With a conversion to a new economic system, complications will
inevitably arise. The government seems to be adjusting to the complications through wage controls and devaluation of the currency. Infla-

16.
17.
18.
& Gray
19.

Jungr, supra note 9, at 9.
Id. at 8.
Telephone interview with James E. Carroll, partner in the Chicago office of Altheimer
(Nov. 19, 1991) [hereinafter Carroll interview].
JOSHUA E. GREENE & P. ISARD, CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMICS 1 (June, 1991). Convertibility is "the freedom
to buy or sell foreign exchange, generally for payments related to international flows of goods,
services, and financial assets." Id.
20. Kaszubski, supra note 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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tion continues to drop while the government has recorded a 3.8 billion
dollar surplus on hard-currency trade.? Despite the apparent drawbacks and moderate successes, the public approval rating of the government at the end of January 1990, was 80%.26 Although this confidence rating has declined steadily over the course of the last two
years, in some sectors substantial public support continues for the
economic reforms.27 Social contentment adds to a positive investment
atmosphere.
II.

INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATIZATION

Once a legitimate investment market becomes apparent, as appears
to be the case with Poland, some important questions regarding the
governance of privatization need to be answered. What are the present
forms of ownership in Poland? Who is supervising the privatization of
state-owned enterprises? What strategies is this supervising agent
taking to privatize the mass quantity of state-owned enterprises?
At present, three groups can initiate the privatization process
within a specific enterprise: 1) a joint application of an enterprise's
director and employees; 2) the founding organ of the enterprise in
conjunction with the aforementioned parties; and 3) the Minister of
Privatization, himself, upon application to a Council of Ministers. 2
To date, there are four main forms of ownership in Poland: 1)
municipal property, with municipal-owned enterprises and municipal
budgetary entities; 2) treasury property, with state-owned enterprises and State budgetary entities, schools and hospitals; 3) property
owned by cooperatives and State farms; and 4) the concern of this
article - private or semi-private property (joint ventures between
state-owned enterprises and private, foreign, or local partners).- According to Dr. Christoph Bandyk, there are approximately 9,000 stateowned enterprises in the "productive" sectors, approximately 4,500 of
which are controlled by the 49 Wojewoda (regional governments).The government intends to privatize the majority of state-owned en-

25. Jungr, supra note 9, at 10.
26. Kaszubskd, supra note 3.
27. Carroll interview, supra note 18.
28. Law on Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises, arts. 5, 6, 29 I.L.M. 1226 (1990)
[hereinafter Law on Privatization]. The official Polish text appears in Dziennik Ustaw, No. 51,
Item 298 (1990).
29.

CHRISTOPHER BANDYK, PRIVATIZATION IN

AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY

30.

POLAND: PROGRAM,

ACHIEVEMENTS

2 (1991).

Id.
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terprises over the next five years,3 1 but the state budgetary entities
32
are, for the foreseeable'future, to remain state property.
Once the ownership structure in Poland is understood, one can
focus upon the departmental control of the privatization process. The
key institutions influencing the privatization process are the Ministry
of Ownership Changes/Transformation (MoOC/MoOT) and the "Founding Organ," which is the relevant ministry or local authority at the
municipal level.- Under the privatization law (to be discussed later),
the privatization of state-owned enterprises is entirely under the direction of the MoOC.3 The principal function of the MoOC is to initiate,
monitor, and control the process of privatizing state-owned enterprises. 35 It is also called upon to provide legal and operational assistance in the privatization of enterprises at the municipal and cooperative
level.-6 One issue (also to be discussed later), is the inability of the
sole ministry handling the privatization process to efficiently accommodate all interested investors. With 9,000 state-owned enterprises to
be privatized, the MoOC cannot spend a year's time on each enterprise
earmarked for privatization.
The present forms of ownership and the department controlling
privatization have been touched upon to clarify Poland's present system. The question of how the MoOC plans to privatize the majority
of the state-owned enterprises must now be addressed. The government has adopted a privatization strategy that focuses on a multi-track
approach comprised of separate privatization paths for the various
categories of enterprises, often with simultaneous use of different
techniques of privatization within a category.3 7 Enterprises are differentiated principally on the basis of their a) size (large enterprises
require a diversified ownership structure, whereas, in most cases,
small and medium-sized enterprises can be sold in whole or substantial
parts to a single acquiror); b) economic and financial viability (viable
companies would then be distinguished as to their immediate salability

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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or need for prior restructuring); and c) ownership (whether an enterprise is state-owned or under the jurisdiction of local authorities). s
Privatization may be accomplished by three different mechanisms:
commercialization, liquidation, and individual privatization. Although
this article concentrates on the individual privatization method, a brief
discussion of all three types is necessary. The initial step of the privatization process is commercialization, the transformation of a stateowned enterprise into a joint stock or limited liability company (singleholder corporation of the state). 39 This step is extended to a) provide a
clear decision-making and control structure; b) adjust the legal status
of state-owned enterprises to meet the requirements of potential
foreign corporate partners; c) create pressure for market-oriented restructuring of the company; and d) prepare the enterprise for privatization.40 Ideally, the Privatization Law envisages that commercialization is initiated by either the enterprise or its founding organ in agreement with the management and workers council, or directed from
41
above by the Prime Minister upon a motion of the MoOC.
An alternative to the commercialization route is privatization
through liquidation. Liquidation of an enterprise results in dissolution
and privatization of its assets. 42 The MoOC can choose to liquidate an
enterprise based upon its size and financial stability. Generally, this
method of privatization is used when no other means are available to
keep the enterprise intact."
The last method of privatization is based upon individual privatization. This form of privatization is similar to the western-style auction,
or public offering.- This direct method of sale to domestic and foreign
investors is more common for the larger and more viable enterprises. 45
However, although many "top 500" enterprises will be privatized
through individual privatization, other smaller enterprises will also be
privatized through this method.46

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 5, 6.
at 5.
at 4.
at 6.
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ANALYSIS OF RECENT LEGISLATION

To assist in achieving the goals and guidelines of the privatization
process, the Polish government has relatively recently enacted two
pieces of landmark legislation. The Privatization Law of 199047 and
the Foreign Investment Law of 19914 have been enacted to clarify

the privatization process and to simplify the stages involved in privatizing. Whether the legislation fulfills its purpose in whole or in part is
the topic of this section.
The Foreign Investment Law was passed by the Sejm 49 in June

of 1991. The law attempts to facilitate the privatization process in
four major areas, thereby revoking and replacing the 1988 Joint Ventures Law. The need for foreign investment permits has been limited
to very few areas. The previous requirement for a minimum investment of $50,000.00 (U.S.) or 20% of the capital stock for contributions
in kind is to be abolished. The automatic three year tax holiday is to
be replaced by a negotiable period of relief applicable only to substantial investors. Compensation is guaranteed in the event of expropriation. Full repatriation of profits, dividends and capital gains are to be
realized. Finally, the level of foreign participation may vary between
0% and 100%.0
A.

What is Required to Invest: Permits, Dollar Amount,
Types of Capital

Although the Privatization Law of 1990 does not mention permits
for privatizing at any great length, the Foreign Investment Law of
1991 is quite specific. Chapter 2, Article 4 states:
The establishment of a company shall require a permit if: 1)
the area of its activities includes at least one of the following:
1) operation of harbors and airports; 2) real-estate broker
activities; 3) the defense industry not requiring a concession;
4) wholesale trade of imported consumer goods; and, 5) performance of legal services. 51

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
I.L.M.

Law on Privatization, supra note 28.
The Foreign Investment Law became effective on July 4, 1991.
The Sejm is the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament.
EurUpdate, Doing Business in Poland, 1991 WL 11687, at *100 (Sept. 1991).
Law of the 14th of June, 1991 on Companies With Foreign Participation, art. 4, 30
871 (1991) [hereinafter Law on Companies with Foreign Participation].
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Acquiring shares of stock in the areas just mentioned also requires
a permit. 52 Permits were required under the former law if an investor
wished to purchase more than 10% of a privatized company. The new
legislation is responsive to investors who had previously complained
about the slow-moving process; by eliminating the permit requirement
(aside from the given exceptions), the MoOC has allowed investors to
concentrate on the negotiation stage rather than spend valuable time
wading through bureaucratic channels. As will be seen later, expediency in the privatization process is an issue that has plagued most
investors and the MoOC. Any step taken to facilitate the process is
an important governmental asset.
If one of the exceptions does apply, Article 16, clause 2, states:
"Due to protection of State interest the Minister of Ownership Transformation may set certain operating conditions in the permit, especially
the ratio between Polish and foreign parties' contributions to the share
(stock) capital of the company or the ratio between votes at the
partners' meeting. "- Furthermore, Article 17 provides: "the MoOT
shall deny issuance of a permit if commencement of the company's
activities would threaten: 1) State economic interests; or 2) State security. Denial of a permit due to the reasons described shall not
require a factual justification."Article 17 seems highly arbitrary at first glance. The government's
ability to deny or withdraw a permit without justification seems to
discourage investment in the areas mentioned. However, the article
does not depart from the practices of many foreign governments.
Given the security interests in the areas listed, one would expect some
added security measures on Poland's part. With this in mind, Poland's
required permit list actually appears to be somewhat limited, thereby
encouraging further investment.
As a practical matter, the permit requirement has not hurt one
prominent law firm. Mr. James E. Carroll, a partner in the Chicago
office of Altheimer and Gray,- stated that although his firm was established in Poland prior to the enactment of the new legislation, the
arbitrary nature of the permit requirement is not a factor. He said,
"Poland is interested in attracting firms and companies with knowledge
of Western business practices. They want to make every assurance

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Carroll

4.
16.
17.
interview, supra note 18.
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of the firm's security, they don't want to discourage it. "56 Based upon

accepted governmental practices and practical applicability, the permit
requirement does not act as a deterrent in Poland's privatization process.
As mentioned previously, the requirement of $50,000.00 (U.S.) or
20% of the capital stock for contributions in kind was abolished to
promote privatization of small-and medium-sized corporations. Privatization in this area has thus far been most successful, leading one to
believe that the measures taken are achieving their purpose. 57 In addition, any removal of a restriction or impediment to foreign investment is beneficial to the entire privatization process.
Although no dollar amount has been fixed to privatization, Article
10 states the form of contribution foreign parties can make to a company's capital:
Capital may be made 1) in Polish currency obtained through
the sale of convertible currency at a foreign currency bank
at the foreign currency purchase rate published by the National Bank of Poland, 2) in-kind, either transferred from
abroad or acquired for Polish currency obtained through the
sale of convertible currency at a foreign currency bank at
the foreign currency purchase rate published by the National
Bank of Poland.There are two important elements that need to be extracted from
Article 10. The first element is Poland's need to establish the convertibility of its currency through the influx of hard currency. The second
element is the relationship between Poland's determination of the
foreign currency purchase rate and the bidding process.
The first element displays a solid commitment of Poland's government to legitimately co-exist in the world economy through currency
convertibility. The second element is somewhat related. One would
think that because the Polish government determines the exchange
rate, many investors would be losing money on the exchange due to
the fluctuating market. The Poles have remedied this condition, at
least for United States investors, by negotiating prices for enterprises
in United States dollars. 59 United States investors feel more comfort-

56. Altheimer & Gray became the first United States law firm to open an office in Warsaw,
Poland. A permit to open the office was issued on July 30, 1990 by the Polish government, and
the office thereby opened on September 1, 1990. Id.
57. Bandyk, supra note 29, at 12.
58. Law on Companies With Foreign Participation, art. 10.
59. Carroll interview, supra note 18.
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able knowing the exchange rates will not fluctuate, and the Polish
government can continue to legitimize the economy with the influx of
hard currency.
B.

Corporate Income Tax Exemption

One aspect of the former Joint Venture Law that will be greatly
missed is the three to six year corporate income tax exemption. Article
23 of The Foreign Investment Law states:
The Minister of Finance, after obtaining a positive opinion
from the appropriate Minister, may exempt a company from
income tax if: 1) the contributions of foreign parties to the
company's initial (share) capital exceed the equivalent of two
million ECU's (equaling roughly 2.75 million U.S. dollars as
of March, 1992) determined in accordance with the rate for
purchase of foreign currency announced by the National
Bank of Poland and further, 2) the economic activity of the
company in particular will be conducted in regions endangered by high structural unemployment, or will ensure
introduction of new technological solutions to the national
economy, or will enable sales of goods or services for export
equalling at least 20% of the overall sales value. The amount
of the exemptions from income tax cannot exceed the value
of the transaction of acquisition or receipt of shares by a
foreign party.
This article went into effect in July of 1991, but many corporations
in the process of negotiation were relying upon the exemption. This
combination of events could result in complications in privatization,
possibly terminating some negotiations. A grandfather clause, entitling
those corporations which began negotiations prior to the enactment
to the exemption, could remedy this concern. Another possibility is
not eliminating the exemption at all. Some economists argue that
incentives display signs of a weak economy. At this point in time,
Poland has a weak economy and wishes to make it stronger. Incentives
induce corporations to invest because they believe they can maximize
their investments. Each one of the enterprises discussed in the case
studies, infra, had nothing but positive remarks about the exemption.
With so many positive aspects related to the tax exemption, it may
be unproductive to eliminate it.

60.

Law on Companies With Foreign Participation, art. 23.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

11

Florida Journal
of International
Law,
Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1991],
FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW Art. 3

[Vol. 6

Poland is caught in a Catch-22. With most of the state enterprises
being small- and medium-sized, investors generally are not entitled
to the income tax exemption (minimum investment: 2,000,000 ECU's).
This type of enterprise is the most numerous, and, thus, should have
some form of incentives to privatize it. When large corporations are
granted the income tax exemption despite a willingness to invest without it. How can Poland generate revenue and remedy the slow moving
privatization process simultaneously. A continued exemption for smalland medium-sized enterprises is one solution, with a gradual elimination by approximately 1995.61 Something less than a 100% exemption
for larger enterprises could subsidize the income lost from granting
the smaller enterprises an exemption, while the large amount of unprivatized enterprises diminishes.
One final aspect of the tax exemption issue is the viewpoint of the
investors. Investors see the exemption as a factor in enterprise valuation. Simply stated, with a tax exemption, a company is worth more;
without it, it is worth less.- Poland must decide if it wants the hard
currency today, while reform is strong, or tomorrow, when reform
may not exist.
C.

Protection of Investment

Investment in Poland at this time carries a high risk due to the
instability of the new economy and government. As with any investment, however, there must be some form of protection against unfair
practices. Poland has undertaken security measures to secure the capital of its foreign investors. Foreign Investment Law Chapter 3, Article 22 states, "Foreign parties shall be assured, based on the principle
of reciprocity, of a payment for indemnification of losses caused by
expropriation or any other acts with equivalent results, up to the
amount equal to the value of their share in company assets."- Poland
also is party to the Paris Convention of 1883 regarding the protection
of industrial property,- the Madrid Agreement of 1891 regarding com-

61. The Polish economy is not predicted to show-signs of overall success and productivity
until 1995.
62. Telephone interview with Steve Clark, General Counsel for Gerber Products Company
(Nov. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Clark interview].
63. Law on Companies With Foreign Participation, art. 22.
64. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372, T.S. No. 379, as revised by Act of Brussels, Dec. 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936, T.S. No. 411,
Act of Washington, June 2, 1911, 37 Stat. 1645, T.S. No. 579, Act of the Hague, Nov. 6, 1925,
47 Stat. 1789, T.S. No. 834, Act of London, June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, T.S. No. 941, Act of
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batting the counterfeit marking of goods,- and several bilateral
treaties providing for fair and equal treatment of investments (with,
for example, United States, Germany, China, Kuwait).- International
agreements offer investors a sense of established legitimacy that the
newly enacted legislation lacks.
Lastly, on March 21, 1990, Poland and the United States signed
a treaty concerning business and economics. The Treaty, which is not
yet in force, provides that United States investors shall be accorded
most favored nation treatment. International law standards are to
apply to expropriation and payment of compensation. Funds shall be
freely transferable, and investment disputes may be taken directly to
binding third-party arbitration without first resorting to domestic
courts.6 7 The combination of these security measures, coupled with
other intangibles, adequately provides investors with investment security.

D.

Repatriation:Removal of Profits

In order to attract foreign investment, Poland had to offer investors
the opportunity to realize their profits. Given the risk of investing in
an untested market, one would expect the opportunity to realize substantial gains. As previously stated, according to the old law a permit
was required to remove profits from the country, and, given that a
corporation could only invest up to 10% of a company's capital, the
rate of return probably was not worth all the procedural redtape.

Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, Act of Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S. No. 1583.
65. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891,
as revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1990, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on Nov.
6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Nice on June 15, 1957, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967,
and as amended on Oct. 2, 1979.
66. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning Business and Economic Relations, Mar. 21, 1990, United
States-Poland, 29 I.L.M. 1194 (1990); Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Nov. 10, 1989, Germany-Poland, 29 I.L.M. 338 (1990).
67. 29 I.L.M. at 1194. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification
by the United States on Oct. 27, 1990, 136 CONG. REC. D1436, D1442 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
The Treaty will enter into force following the exchange of instruments of ratification which has
not yet taken place. See Poland: Polish Premier Announces New Initiative to Bring U.S.
Investment Treaty Into Force, BNA Int'l Bus. Daily (Apr. 15, 1992).
68. See generally BNA Special Correspondent, East-West Trade - U.S. Treaty With Poland
Expected to Widen Opportunitiesfor Investors, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1330 (Sept. 11, 1991).
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Article 25 of the Foreign Investment Law corrects this problem
by stating:
1) After payment of applicable taxes, [30% on dividends for
foreign investors, 20% for non-Polish employees] a foreign
party is entitled to purchase, at a foreign currency bank,
foreign currency in the amount paid to this party by the
company as its share of the profits, which share of profits
is calculated according to an audit certificate issued in the
company's name by the party authorized by the Minister of
Finance to audit the annual balance sheets and that performed such an audit. 2) A foreign party has the right to
transfer abroad the amount of currency purchased from a
foreign currency bank [transfer of profits], as specified in
Section 1, without a separate foreign exchange permit. 69
It is important to note that this clause is essential to the privatization process. Without complete realization of profits, few investors
would partake in the investment risks. As a supplement to this clause,
Poland and the United States are parties to a Double Tax Convention
on Income,7° and Poland has lowered the 30% tax on dividends, increas71
ing investor profits.
E.

Valuation of Property: Assets

One issue that arises when privatizing state-owned enterprises is
property valuation, one must determine how much an enterprise is
worth although real estate has not been previously valued, and production has been artificially maintained over an extended period of time.
According to Dr. Christoph Bandyk,
In the case of public offerings, each enterprise will be
evaluated independently by specialist firms and potential acquirors will be provided with the prospectus specifying asset
valuation, historical financial data and the program for the
enterprise's operations in the future. The prospectus will
comply in full with the disclosure regulations of the (Polish)

69. Law on Companies With Foreign Participation, art. 25.
70. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 8, 1974, United States-Poland., 28 U.S.T. 891, T.I.A.S.
No. 8486.
71. Clark interview, supra note 62.
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Securities and Exchange Commission. The share issues will
provide a basis for the development of a securities market,
particularly, stock trading. 72
Private offerings are valued in much the same fashion; independent
firms provide asset valuation, and investors negotiate final details. As
will be illustrated in the case studies, a legal analysis accompanies the
valuation, determining an enterprise's legal rights and/or claims of
property rights through past owners or heirs.7 Some important issues
that arise when determining asset valuation are: 1) what factors, other
than those explicitly stated by the independent firm, influence the
successful privatization of an enterprise; and 2) how much leverage
each party carries in the negotiation stage.
F.

Ownership By Polish Citizens: Citizens' Rights to Privatization

Despite Poland's current need for it, the country will not always
be so reliant on foreign investment. Ultimately, once the economy is
a self-reliant functioning organ, the government will want to curtail
the influx of foreign investment because of the increased purchasing
power of its citizens. Steps have been taken to assure the citizens of
Poland that they are included in the reformation of the economy, that
affect foreign investors.
Article 24 of the Privatization Law of 1990 states: "Employees of
a state-owned enterprise transformed into a corporation have the right
to purchase 20% of the shares owned by the State Treasury on preferential terms. The employees shall retain the right to purchase and
acquire additional shares according to general non-preferential
terms."7 4 The preferential terms equal a 50% discount, compared to
shares transferred on non-preferential terms. Presently under discussion is a free distribution of 10% of the shares of any state enterprise
to its employees. This proposal would replace the preferential sale of
shares currently in effect. 75

72. Bandyk, supra note 29, at 6.
73. Polish citizens who show clear and convincing evidence of property ownership prior to
State seizure have been given title in many cases. Others may be able to receive vouchers for
shares of stock.
74. Law on Privatization, art. 24.
75. Carroll interview, supra note 18.
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Article 25 of the Privatization Law considers Polish citizens who
are not currently involved with a privatized corporation:
1) upon the request of the Council of Ministers, the Sejm
shall enact a resolution governing the issuance of privatization vouchers which may be used as payment for: (1) acquisition of shares issued by a corporation created by the transformation of the state-owned enterprise; (2) acquisition of
rights in financial funds (mutual funds) holding shares issued
upon the transformation of state-owned enterprises; (3) acquisition of an enterprise's assets and organized parts of
assets of the state-owned enterprises referred to in Article
37. 2) Privatization vouchers are provided free of charge for
all Polish citizens living in Poland.7 6
Commencement of voucher distribution has not been set at this
time. However, the concept is a good one. As mentioned previously,
Poland needs to create purchasing power among its citizens. Increased
.spending and/or circulation of currency is what Poland's economy requires to become successful.
IV.

PRACTICAL

APPLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE
CASE STUDIES

ENACTMENTS:

Specific articles of legislation have been analyzed to show the
guidelines to which every potential investor must adhere in the privatization process. Applying the articles to privatization cases, however,
can uncover obstacles not apparent in the black-letter law. A study
of three specific investment cases will not only display the practical
workings of the legislation, but will uncover the issues not spotted on
the printed page.
On March 15, 1991, the first successful transaction in which a
foreign firm was permitted under Poland's new Privatization Law to
acquire a formally-owned government enterprise was completed. 77 Although the three cases that follow all differ, it is interesting to see
how these subsequent transactions imitate or stray from the precedents of the initial transaction.

76.

Law on Privatization, art. 25.

77.

P. Stankard & R. Wallwork, Historic Transaction in Poland, News Release -

Al-

theimer & Gray (Mar. 15, 1991) [hereinafter News Release].
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A.

Beloit Corporation

Beloit Corporation, a subsidiary of Harnischfeger Industries, Inc.
of Wisconsin, acquired an 80% interest in Fabryka Maszyn Papierniezych S.A. (FAMPA), Poland's oldest and largest paper mill machinery manufacturer. James E. Carroll, a partner in the Chicago office
of Altheimer and Gray, and Gabriel Wujek, a partner in the Warsaw
office, supervised this transaction. Information in this section is based
upon a November 19, 1991 phone conversation with Mr. Carroll,7 8
along with a news release published by Altheimer and Gray.79
As previously mentioned, three independent bodies can initiate the
privatization of an enterprise. In the case at hand, FAMPA's directors
and employees commenced discussions regarding Beloit Corp. FAMPA
had been an existing licensee of Beloit for approximately 26 years,
and FAMPA's personnel desired a possible venture with the American
enterprise. FAMPA thus approached the MoOT about the possible
venture. As the largest paper mill machinery maker, FAMPA was
deemed to be a viable enterprise for privatization. Based upon
FAMPA's viability, the MoOT approached Beloit about the possible
venture.
Beloit, through 26 years of business dealings, knew FAMPA was
a good business associate, despite not knowing the economics and
profits of the company. Beloit felt comfortable with FAMPA's management and welcomed the idea of expansion into Central Europe. Once
an interest in purchasing FAMPA was established, a number of issues
arose: who would value the company; what assurances of real estate
ownership could be given; and how large a role FAMPA's employees
would play in, for example, management and ownership.
The first step, once interest was established, was opening the
bidding process.- The Polish government retained the services of N.M.
Rothchild, an investment banker, to determine the value of FAMPA.
Beloit did its own evaluation based upon company procedures. Although both firms did not the discuss the terms of the valuation,
various bids were offered in an arduous negotiation process. The final
terms of the'agreement were for Beloit to purchase FAMPA for 66.5
billion Polish zlotys ($7 million U.S.), and a commitment to invest
another 142.5 billion zlotys ($15 million U.S.) to develop the products,

78.
79.
80.

Carroll interview, supra note 18.
News Release, supra note 77.
It is unknown whether other bidders submitted competitive offers.
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manufacturing facilities, and markets of the company. All prices were
discussed in American dollars, thereby eliminating concerns of money
being lost through exchange movements.
Beloit purchased FAMPA's stock from the State Treasury and
received all of what FAMPA owned, "whether it wanted it or not."
The last statement brings up an important point that serves as a
recurring theme in most privatization cases. In Poland's quest to
privatize the majority of state-owned enterprises, it has been forced
to "package" many enterprises.
Packaging enterprises entails including various service industries,
health care facilities, and enterprises that are less viable with the
larger enterprises. A model example of this practice is illustrated in
the Pepsi Co., Inc. purchase of the Polish chocolate-maker Wedel. In
order to purchase the Wedel enterprise, Pepsi Co. had to purchase a
health clinic, a rehabilitation center, two nursery schools, a recreation
center, several hotels, and housing for retirees8, In defense of Poland's
practice, if Poland allowed investors to "pick and choose" the most
productive enterprises, nothing would be left to interest buyers in the
remaining companies. Poland would be left "paying the bill" while
investors reaped the benefits of Poland's generosity. At the very least,
it will be interesting to follow the progression and sophistication of
this practice.
Prior to closing the transaction with FAMPA, Beloit was concerned
with the security of its investment. Poland had not yet developed the
Foreign Investment Law containing the provision on expropriation,
and Poland had not entered into any treaties with the United States
guaranteeing security of investment. Although Poland was a party to
longstanding international agreements, those agreements did not form'
the basis of Beloit's security. Beloit based its decision upon intangibles:
Poland's willingness to receive the foreign investor and, more importantly, upon a general analysis of the Polish economy. The analysis,
above all, displayed Poland's commitment to reform and the legitimacy
of the means of reform.
As mentioned earlier, Article 24 of the Privatization Law provides
that employees have the right to purchase 20% of the shares owned
by the State Treasury on preferential terms (50% deduction). It is
believed that this practice will provide incentives for productivity and
quality. In FAMPA's case, the program has been very successful. All
shares were purchased on the first day, and the demand was so great

81. Schares, Eastern Europe Tries to Stoke Up Its Fire Sale, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 21,
1991, at 53.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol6/iss3/3

18

Marszal: PrivatizationPRIVATIZATION
in Poland: A Legal
Analysis of Foreign Investment
IN POLAND

that shares were oversubscribed. In that situation, the State Treasury
must distribute shares on a pro rata basis. An employee would be
foolish not to take advantage of this distribution; each employee has
three years to pay for the shares and, in the meantime, may sell them
for at least double or triple the price. Although there has been some
concern regarding employee resistance to investment, the FAMPA
employees appeared to be very satisfied. The employee shareholders
attended the first shareholders meeting ever held in Poland. Everything was agreed to in the meeting, which was similar to a United
States shareholder meetingY2 As to management, with the exception
of a few Americans possessing Western business knowledge, the personnel in FAMPA remained Polish. Beloit was satisfied with the management's performance and retained the group for its expertise in
future matters.
In past years, Poland has maintained an inefficient number of employees in the workplace and has pre-determined production rate despite demand. 3 It is unclear how Beloit will address these issues given
Western standards of efficiency. Perhaps Beloit will have a large
amount of lay-offs in the ensuing years. This presumably will be a
gradual process, and some compensation may be given. One could
imply that the distribution of shares without payment due for three
years could serve as such compensation. Production may also have to
be cut back until Beloit can locate outlets for its product. There were
no guaranteed sales when Beloit purchased FAMPA. Beloit will have
to solicit merchants, many of whom may be the same merchants who
dealt with FAMPA (FAMPA can serve an export market).
In concluding the discussion with Mr. Carroll, the question was
asked, "Generally speaking, what is your perception of the overall
privatization process' strengths and weaknesses?" Mr. Carroll stated
that the greatest strength is Poland's willingness to cooperate with
investors and learn about Western business practices. Poland is going
through a major restructuring. Despite complications, Poland maintains an optimistic outlook on the privatization process. The inevitable
weaknesses are a terrible communication system and the very slow
privatization process. "There are thousands of companies. The process
must be much more streamlined to accommodate all the interested
parties." As a concluding note, FAMPA's stock will not be traded on
the new Polish Stock Exchange.

82. Employee shareholders have all of the rights typical of a Western shareholder, e.g.,
voting.
83. These were characteristics of a non-market economy.
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Gerber

On October 1, 1991, Poland's Ministry of Privatization and Gerber
Products Company signed an agreement under which Gerber will acquire Alima, S.A., the largest baby food and juices company in Central
Europe. The transaction was closed on February 12, 1992. The terms
published are as follows: Gerber purchased 60% of Alima for an amount
in excess of $11 million (U.S.) and expects to invest at least another
$14 million (U.S.) in future capital improvements. It is estimated that
Gerber could invest up to an additional $42 million (U.S.).
The preceding information, along with further information regarding the specifics of the Alima acquisition, was obtained via phone
conversations with John Pelehach, senior corporate attorney for
Gerberf and Steve Clark, general counsel. 86 When asked how the
relationship originated between Gerber and Alima, Mr. Pelehach
stated that Gerber began doing business in Poland on an export basis
approximately three to four years ago. Through that presence, an
employee of Gerber working in Poland became familiar with Alima's
products and began investigating a possible business association between the two companies. When, in the meantime, the Polish government selected Alima as a candidate for privatization, Gerber was very
interested.8 7 As part of the privatization process, Alima had an investment banker evaluate the enterprise and begin approaching firms
within the food industry. An offering memorandum provided by the
Polish government asked interested parties for return offers. At this
stage, Gerber took steps to determine the viability of purchasing
Alima. The factory was well-suited for Gerber's products. Alima was
situated in an area that had an abundance of fruits and vegetables
that could be used in Gerber products. The company had fast access
to a quality glass manufacturing plant. Finally, Poland was well
situated for shipping products into Eastern and Western Europe.
Despite these factors, Gerber needed to feel comfortable about the
stability of Poland's economy and confident of their ability to protect

84.

Poland's Ministry of PrivatizationSells Alima to Gerber Products Company, Gerber

Products Company Communication #91-122 (Oct. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Gerber Products Company
Communication].
85. Telephone interview with John A. Pelehach, senior corporate attorney at Gerber Products Company (Nov. 18, 1991).
86. Clark interview, supra note 62.
87. Alima is one of the best managed companies in Poland. It operates the most modern
baby food plant in Central Europe, and its Bobo line of products is the market leader in Poland.
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their investment dollars. Like Beloit, Gerber knew of Poland's participation in multilateral treaties protecting intellectual property, but did
not focus on that aspect of security. Instead, Gerber was influenced
more by an intangible: Poland's desire to obtain membership in the
European Economic Community (EEC). Gerber believed that Poland's
focus on eventual EEC membership would shape policy-making and
legislation in a favorable manner and reduce the risk of a nonmainstream legal or regulatory environment being created. Additionally, Gerber found that Poland's existing body of laws, while mostly
antedating World War II, was based largely on Western European
antecedents, something with which Gerber was comfortable.
Gerber acquired the services of Wasserstein, Perella & Co., an
outside investment banking firm, to help in the bidding process. When
asked what major factors influenced the valuation and bidding process,
Mr. Clark stated that the income tax exemption was an important
part, but would not comment on specific contract figures.
Thus far, the case studies mention the significance of the income
tax exemption. This suggests that the exemption does, in fact, serve
as an important incentive among investors. Elimination or restriction
of this incentive would provide important tax revenue but would likely
have a great negative impact on the value of the company the Polish
government sells, as well as the privatization process as a whole.
When all factors were considered, Gerber submitted a proposal to
purchase Alima. The Minister of Privatization, Janusz Lewandowski,
when announcing the acceptance of Gerber's bid stated, "The Alima
acquisition will enable Gerber to produce branded products not only
for the domestic market in Poland, but for export to other countries."8
The last statement raises issues facing many foreign investors:
Whether there is a large enough market for ones product; whether
there is enough purchasing power in Poland; and whether the investor
is "saddled" with the old product, and if not, who will buy the new
ones. Alima is taking measures to secure current trading customers
and to solicit new ones. Both Mr. Pelehach and Mr. Clark stated that
Alima will continue to sell its current product line. The capabilities
of the Alima sales force will be enhanced to provide support for both
Alima and Gerber products. Alima had 1990 sales of $18 million (U.S.),
their current products are well-liked, and they have a viable market.
Perhaps the principal change will be increased production.
The issue of the monetary form of sales receipts did not greatly
concern Mr. Clark. He maintained that there was no problem with

88.

Gerber Products Company Communication, supra note 67.
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hard currency in Poland because the Polish zloty is internally convertible. He did state, however, that products would be difficult to export
to countries that lack hard currency, such as the states that previously
made up the U.S.S.R. Exporting to those countries, at least at this
time, would have to be on a sale by sale basis. Mr. Clark also stated
that Alima's products did not match Gerber's, as Alima's primary
product lines are nectar products, as opposed to pureed fruits and
vegetables. Gerber would continue to take advantage of Alima's consumer appeal but would also introduce new products into the European
market. Detailed marketing strategies are currently being developed.
A major issue discussed in the Beloit case study concerned employee ownership and employee status. As this is of substantial concern
for the success of privatization, it should be analyzed in Gerber's
acquisition in the same fashion. When Gerber purchased Alima, it was
only allowed to purchase 60% of Alima's stock. Twenty percent was
offered to Alima's employees, and 20% was offered to agricultural
suppliers. As the Privatization Law only provides for 20% purchase
by employees, the issue arose as to why 40% was allotted. When Mr.
Pelehach was asked this question, he stated that this figure was based
on the Ministry's interpretation as to whether there was to be an
overall allotment of 20%, or 20% to each party. The Ministry interpreted it as 20% to each party, both employees and suppliers. Gerber
accepted the 60% purchase.
There has been some criticism in the press regarding Gerber's
purchase of Alima, but the employees appear satisfied. Gerber has
sent a high-level executive to work with the Polish management team,
which is described as "very good." The management will remain overwhelmingly Polish. An interesting contract agreement was made regarding Alima's 1,000 employees and 4,500 agricultural suppliers.
Gerber has agreed to maintain current employment levels and contracts with suppliers for a period of 18 months. When asked if major
cutbacks would be made at the end of 18 months, Mr. Clark stated
that Gerber would attempt to significantly increase production with
the addition of its product. With this in mind, employees might not
be cut back. This provision is significant because of the positive effect
it may have on privatization. As concern about unemployment mounts,
job assurances could greatly ease the transition into foreign ownership . 9

89. Gerber purchased housing for employees, in order to assist employees who would normally have to travel long distances to work.
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As in the initial case study, Mr. Clark was asked about his perception of the privatization process' strengths and weaknesses. Mr. Clark
stated that communications in Poland presented a big problem. Warsaw had satellite hook-ups, but other regions had to be reached by
facsimile machine. Mr. Clark stated that the process needed to move
more quickly, but noted that "[t]he Polish government is aware that
it is not as efficient as it should be. Presently they are using as many
Westerners as possible to gain experience. They are doing a good job
of recognizing their limited resources." 9 As with FAMPA, it does not
appear that Alima's stock will be publicly traded on the Polish stock
market.
C.

Cargill Corporation

The first two case studies represented substantial investments by
two prominent foreign investors. The next case study analyzes Cargill
Corp., a large corporation with a substantially smaller investment.
Although Cargill has not reached the stage of investment that Beloit
or Gerber has, many interesting issues also arise when negotiating a
smaller transaction.
Cargill is a company that specializes in grain and feed production.
The company was interested in expanding into the European market,
and thus sent an employee to Poland to inspect and evaluate feed
mills as potential centers of production. With a lack of competition in
the feed mill business, the Polish government was less likely to actively
seek out investors than in the two previous case studies. The Polish
government, in the early stages of privatization, wishes to privatize
the larger, more viable enterprises. As will be seen, the lack of competition in the feed mill business was advantageous for Cargill.
The employee that represented Cargill was Edgar T. Savidge, who
also provided the information for this particular study. 91 Mr. Savidge
stated that his company inspected many sites before putting in a bid
for Sierpc, the Polish feed mill. Sierpc was formerly owned by a
government enterprise known as Bacutil. There are other governmental bodies, like Bacutil, that own enterprises. According to Mr.
Savidge, "There are enterprises that are owned solely by the State

90. See Barbara Durr, AT&T to Modernize Poland'sTelephones, FINANCIAL TIMES, June
7, 1991, at 4. Poland's State telecommunications system, PPTT, on June 6, 1991 signed a 100
million dollar deal with United States based AT&T to expand and modernize its antiquated
telephone network. Id.
91. Telephone interview with Edgar T. Savidge (Oct. 17, 1991).
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or local government, and there are enterprises that are owned in
clusters - many enterprises owned together." As stated previously,
the governmental body that owns a cluster of enterprises is torn
between selling one of the best enterprises in the cluster while being
stuck with the less viable ones and retaining the enterprise until some
corporation offers to buy all the enterprises.
As in the other case studies, the Polish government acquired the
services of a non-Polish international accounting firm to value the
enterprise. The firm based the bidding price upon current assets and
projected value. Upon further negotiation, Cargill submitted a bid to
purchase 60% of the enterprise (employee distribution of shares has
not yet been discussed). An important obstacle mid-way through the
negotiations, however, was the implementation of the Foreign Investment Law of June 14, 1991. It appears that Cargill was relying upon
the income tax exemption when it submitted its bid. As the corporation
did not have enough money invested, the exemption was eliminated.
Because the takeover target was a smaller corporation, this obstacle
could have jeopardized the privatization process. As the only bidder
on this particular enterprise, Cargill had some leverage regarding the
overall transaction. Thus, further negotiations had to follow. The end
result was an attempt to persuade Cargill to purchase another enterprise
along with Sierpc. Mr. Savidge stated that the whole process was much
too drawn out. "What is done in a week or a month in the United
States, quadruples in Europe." The final application for the proposed
venture cannot be filed until the issue of purchasing another enterprise
is settled.
In concluding this case study, one can see that smaller issues become much more burdensome when dealing with smaller investors.
As most of the state's enterprises are small-to medium-sized, measures
should be taken to promote and facilitate privatization in this area.
Cargill was used to illustrate the difficulty for both parties. In the
negotiation stage of privatization, Cargill invested a great deal of time
and money and did not want to go home empty-handed. Poland did
not want to encourage the "picking and choosing" of the best enterprises for a relatively small amount of investment. This conflict of
interests may arise frequently enough to demand some solutions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Poland is at the crossroads of the privatization process. It is far
more advanced than Romania or the former U.S.S.R., but has much
further to go to achieve the success of Hungary or the Czechoslovak
Republics. There remain possible risks involved with the current
privatization process. In addition, certain conditions inhibit the current
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pace of transformation. There are, however, measures that can be
taken to overcome these obstacles.
An inadequate inventory of enterprises to be privatized is a possible
risk involved with the current privatization process. An insufficient
number of state-owned enterprises are being commercialized, forcing
many investors to seek potential sites in other countries. Workers'
resistance to the overall privatization effort has resulted from unemployment caused by the restructuring of inefficient enterprises.
Polish citizens have rejected substantial foreign involvement. Lastly,
the privatization process has become somewhat overly politicized with
future elections, therefore becoming ineffective.- Equally important
are the institutional constraints which have inhibited the pace of transformation: 1) the lack of institutional capacity to deal with the growing
number of involuntary bankruptcies, and. voluntary commercializations, privatization and liquidations; 2) the occasional conflicting roles
of the various agencies involved in the process; 3) the slow (and expensive) individual process of the one-by-one privatization of medium and
large enterprises being prepared by the MoOC; [and] 4) the inadequacy
of the financial sector and the absence of supporting institutions required to effect ready transfers of ownership interest from one owner
to another93 All of these issues need to be resolved in order to facilitate
a complicated process.
There are measures that can be taken to overcome these obstacles.
Perhaps one method would be to develop a new mass privatization
program. Commercialization could be used for the 500 largest enterprises, followed by individual or mass privatization. Smaller enterprises could be privatized essentially through liquidation. 9 Another
possible measure would be to actually distribute vouchers. With a new
source of purchasing power, Polish citizens might change negative
views on foreign investment. As mentioned earlier, contract clauses
assuring continued employment for a period of time could also ease
the transition to a new economy. Lastly, new ministries or institutions
should be created to deal with the thousands of enterprises slated for
privatization. Perhaps local governments could be provided more authority to privatize enterprises, or at least small- or medium-sized
firms.

92.
93.
94.

Bandyk, supra note 29, at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id.
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Poland has displayed a solid commitment to the reform process.
Although there are, and will continue to be, complications, Poland has
recognized its limited resources. Through Western knowledge and
technology, Poland could create a strong economic presence in the
twenty-first century. Although no one can be certain of the outcome
of this privatization process, one thing is certain: Poland initiated what
we now see in Central and Eastern Europe, and Poland will give
100% to make it work.
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